شناسایی تعیین‌کنندگان قوی ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی به کمک رویکرد بیزی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانش آموخته دکترای اقتصاد بخش عمومی، گروه اقتصاد دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اداری، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم آباد، ایران.

10.22034/qjws.2023.1987526.1108

چکیده

جنگ داخلی پیامدهای منفی اقتصادی و غیراقتصادی متعددی به‌دنبال خواهد داشت؛ بر این اساس شناسایی عوامل مؤثر بر وقوع جنگ داخلی در جهت به حداقل رساندن احتمال وقوع آن، از اهمیت ویژه‌ای برخوردار است. در این راستا، هدف اصلی پژوهش حاضر شناسایی تعیین‌کنندگان قوی ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی در 127 کشور جهان (شامل ایران) طی سال‌های 2020-2001 و با استفاده از رویکرد میانگین‌گیری مدل بیزی (BMA) می‌باشد. به این منظور از 21 متغیر، در 5 گروه: 1. متغیرهای اقتصادی 2. فراوانی منابع طبیعی 3. متغیرهای جمعیتی 4. متغیرهای اجتماعی و 5. متغیرهای سیاسی، استفاده شده است. با برآورد 100000 رگرسیون و میانگین‌گیری بیزی از ضرایب، تعیین‌کنندگان قوی ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی مشخص شده‌اند. بر اساس نتایج به‌دست‌آمده، متغیرهای شاخص حکمرانی خوب با احتمال 99 درصد و اثرگذاری منفی، تنش‌های مذهبی و نژادی با احتمال 97 درصد و اثرگذاری مثبت و شاخص توسعه انسانی با احتمال 96 درصد و اثرگذاری منفی، اثر حتمی و قوی بر ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی داشته‌اند. شاخص شرایط اقتصادی و جمعیت کل نیز با اثرگذاری مثبت به‎‌ترتیب با احتمال 91 و 76 درصد، چهارمین و پنجمین متغیر با اهمیت در توضیح ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی بوده‌اند. سایر متغیرها نیز اثر ضعیف و یا بی‌اهمیت بر ریسک وقوع جنگ داخلی داشته‌اند. بر این اساس می‌توان گفت که کشورهای برخوردار از نهادهای باکیفیت‌تر، شاخص‌های توسعه انسانی بالاتر، تنش‌های مذهبی و نژادی کمتر، وضعیت اقتصادی مطلوب‌تر و جمعیت کوچک‌تر احتمال وقوع جنگ داخلی پائین‌تری خواهند داشت.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Identifying Robust Determinants of the Civil War Risk Using Bayesian Approach

نویسنده [English]

  • abolghasem golkhandan
Ph.D. of Public Sector Economics, School of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Lorestan University, Khoram Abad, Iran.
چکیده [English]

The civil war will have many negative economic and non-economic consequences. In this regard, the main purpose of the current research is to identify the robust determinants of the civil war risk in 127 countries of the world (including Iran) during the years 2001-2020 and using the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach. For this purpose, 21 variables have been used in 5 groups: 1. Economic variables, 2. The abundance of natural resources, 3. Demographic variables, 4. Social variables, and 5. Political variables. By estimating 100,000 regressions and Bayesian averaging of coefficients, robust determinants of the civil war risk have been identified. Based on the results, the variables the good govrnance index with a 99% probability and negative effect, religious and racial tensions with a 97% probability and positive effect, and human development index with a 96% probability and negative effect have a definite and robust effect on the civil war risk. The index of economic conditions and the total population with a 91% and 76% probability, respectively, have been the fourth and fifth important variables in explaining the civil war risk with a positive effect. Other variables have a weak or insignificant effect on the risk of civil war. Based on this, it can be said that countries with higher quality institutions, higher human development indicators, less religious and racial tensions, a more favourable economic situation and a smaller population will have a lower probability of civil war.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Civil War
  • Risk
  • Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) Approach
  • Robust Determinants

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